An independent review has been launched to identify and address lessons for UK infrastructure as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire.
Former government chief construction advisor Prof Peter Hansford has been asked to lead the review for the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE).
According to ICE, the review will not duplicate the government enquiry into the specific failings at Grenfell, nor will it address matters that are subject to a criminal investigation.
ICE president Prof Tim Broyd said: “ICE’s aim with this review is to establish what needs to be done to mitigate the risk of a similar tragedy resulting from the failure of infrastructure assets or networks.
“As the world’s premier civil engineering organisation it is right that we assess whether change is needed to how we procure, design, construct and maintain the UK’s infrastructure.”
Prof Hansford’s review will be complete by the end of October 2017.
“The Grenfell Tower tragedy has quite rightly led to a period of deep reflection amongst civil engineers about what the failings at Grenfell highlight for practices across the construction sector,” said Prof Hansford. “Inevitably the Judicial Inquiry and any criminal investigation may take time to complete. It is important however that the profession moves quickly to capture and implement lessons as quickly as possible.”
Issues to be covered by the review include:
- Competency and capability within owners, clients and all tiers of the supply chain, including capabilities to understand and manage whole systems
- Responsibility and accountability for safety at all stages of the assets’ life-cycle
- Inspection and quality assurance regimes during and following construction, operational management and in-service modification, refurbishment and re-fit
- Creation, maintenance and implementation of regulation, guidance and codes & standards
- Assessment and management of system related risks
- The effectiveness of industry efforts to understand and apply lessons from recent catastrophic failures
- The impact of procurement practice, commercial arrangements and changes to professional roles and culture on all of the above.
Updated: Grenfell fire highlights ‘serious failure’ and cladding concerns
More emphasis should be placed on the original designers of the cladding system. I have not heard any mention of or comments from the architects.
Devolution for infrastructure (building safety, roads, rail, airports…) is a major mistake. It causes disparities in the costs that makes the budget more difficult to predict and hinder tax reductions. It is not possible to ensure the expertise locally. Standardisation, uniformisation and national expertise is a must for infrastructure. Devolution is good for arts, businesses corporate rates, sports. But for infrastructure (buildings, schools, rail, roads, airports) it is one of the greatest and costliest mistake of this century.
No. we do not need centralisation of design, construction etc. By all means have national/interrnational standards, but the choice must remain with the owner, who also has to take responsibility for any short comings
Let’s hope the review looks at causes and not just the effects. Currently all the attention seems to have been on the cladding. As engineers we must hope that the reviewers go back to first principles, the cause, effect and consequence of failure. Apparently a fridge caught fire, was this a fridge failure or the result of a power surge, as the latest “news” has suggested? Maybe the fire service would be better employed checking white goods in flats and communal housing. I suspect that some of the residents of Grenfell Tower may have purchased second hand white goods if some of the reportage is to be believed as to their financial situation. Who knows what condition of some of these items may have been in? As engineers, we know the consequences of failure are almost always completely out of proportion to the original failure.
That is what Reliability centred Maintenance taught us all those years ago!
I am available to the Grenfell review group if they care to get to the bottom of this catastrophic failure.
Quite right, Hugh. Have a look at the following document.
https://www.ior.org.uk/app/images/downloads/Holborn%202Mar%20London%20final.pdf
Need I say more?
Thanks for the link Richard. All good points re how to reduce fridge fire incidents. What we need to know is why did a simple fridge fire leap to the external cladding through what link did it travel?
Thanks for that link Richard. That report should be made the first item on the 10 pm news whenever Grenfell Tower gets airtime. Maybe the LFB should be asked to comment on the report rather than getting political. The date of the report, March 2017, makes it even more telling.
Another link which is of interest.
http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/news/LatestNewsReleases_gaping-hole-in-fridge-freezer-safety.asp
The bottleneck which appears to delaying any action taking place is the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the body that sets the global standards for the manufacture of fridges and freezers.
Surely a group of suitably qualified and experienced people sitting round a table could sort this in an afternoon. Cladding and structural considerations aside, Priority One is probably mandatory alternative escape routes that aren’t cluttered with bin bags of domestic waste.
I agree, but there aren’t many “suitably qualified and experienced” individuals around. Most of them died some time ago.
The real question that must be addressed is, why did a simple internal event like a fridge fire pass through the structure’s fire barriers, and ignite the external cladding? Also what must be investigated is why the initial fire was dealt with to the satisfaction of the fire service, who were about to depart the scene only to discover on looking outside the cladding was alight?
There was clearly something amiss with the integrity of the structure and its fire spreading prevention barriers.
The review here should be very easy to achieve… don’t compromise the basic design! Grenfell tower, like many others, was designed in such a way that a fire would be contained to a single flat. This has happened time and time again in various tower blocks of similar design, and the design has worked: fires were contained.
By modifying the building, that basic criteria was compromised, and the entire building put at risk.
It astounds me that no-one considered that cladding the outside of a completely non-combustible concrete building with a combustible material might just possibly compromise the basic design for fire safety of the building.
Had the insulation been applied to the interior of the building, the basic design would not have been compromised. (and personally I think it looked better before the cladding… but that’s just me)
If you propose a major design change to a system, you have to consider how that design change affects the performance of the whole system. This is fundamental.
“….propose a major design change to a system, you have to consider how that design change affects the performance of the whole system.”
The mnemonic we developed over many years of changes: BLUETIT
Before Leading, Understand Everything , Think It Through. It works, but of course we simple Engineers are nothing like as clever as the ‘shams’ who will be able to put their children and grandchildren through college on the basis of the money they will make in the litigation which will certainly follow.
Perhaps some thoughts about ‘insurance’ of buildings is also appropriate. One of my last expert witness projects was to investigate why a vast mill complex (the explosion and subsequent fire was one of, if not the largest insurance claim in the USA ever) should behave as it did. Had one set out to ensure that if a small fire started somewhere, one could almost guarantee that the fire would spread everywhere else, the state of that ‘mill’ before it exploded would have been ideal!
The mill were suing their insurers, who were counter claiming and suing the suppliers of machinery, raw-material, it went on and on. {I am reminded of a case where a fabric fault at weaving was supposedly the fault of the spinner of the yarns, who’s solicitor actually suggested that there might be a case against the breed of sheep involved! Faced with this rubbish, common sense and a wish to clear the matter up quickly is demonstrated as the very last thing those profiting from the conflict, not its outcome wish.
My instructing solicitors (one of the largest US firms) liked my simple description “may we sue the trees in the forest if the wood shavings on the floor of our carpenters’ shop catch fire….”-but what worried me greatly was that (as I have found on at least three occasions in this and other claims) whilst the technical experts readily and quickly (about 3 days!) can agree as to what happened, the lawyers -ON ALL SIDES_ (in this case, I counted over 20 at one meeting in Boston, all charging $300+ per hour!) want to drag the entire matter out for ever: [that’s what pays them the most!] and most certainly do NOT want any quick (and correct answers) answers.
Seems to me Hansford’s review should include a comparative review of the fire and building regulations and inspection procedures and sign-offs required of other countries who have lots of high-rise buildings. There is always somebody else who does it better. And they should be found and emulated.
It does not seem that the UK is anywhere near the forefront in this respect. And that is an embarrassment that needs to be acknowledged and rectified forthwith.
This fire has exposed – not for the first time – an absolute can of worms at EVERY level of engineering/architecture/city-planning iro fire-protection design, the proven validation thereof; and the actual fire-fighting and evacuation response when catastrophes got out of control.
Surely an accidental fire in a dwelling can happen it is a clearly known risk and whilst this risk can be reduced by having safe gas and electrical appliances and fixed installation, appropriate furniture , not hoarding stuff, extinguishing cigarettes, candles etc. and closing doors before retiring to bed, this is not always possible for all people who have different levels of income and physical and mental capacity.
What is wrong here is how this has escalated and so terribly affected people beyond the flat in which the fire started.
Do current regulations consider the liklihood of fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the appropriate response to that by fire services if it happens?
What penetrations are there to the compartment in a tower to the cladding outside and how are they controlled? Fire could spread by open windows and burning curtains, badly detailed cavity closure around windows, extract ventilation ductwork – was it plastic or steel pipe, did it discharge into the cavity, were dampers specified? Were the appropriate doors fitted to all flats with self-closers? Was there appropriate evaluation of risk following fires with similar cladding products? Should gas be present in high rise, if you don’t have it will residents bring in their own bottled gas to cook on?
The most glaring issue to consider though is why no sprinklers were fitted. The main driver I suspect is cost, but that pales into insignificance against the cost of the consequences here and the insecurity of countless others living in the high rise. My reading of the affect of sprinklers is they would most likely of put the original fire out, or at least controlled it and would also perhaps have reduced the affects even if the fire did spread into adjacent flats, giving fire service a chance to put out fires in other flats before it engulfed the block.
One of the chief reasons for not fitting sprinkler systems to residential properties in the 1960’s was concern about vandalism. A false initiation would effectively reduce all the flats soft furnishings to rubbish. Having been involved in a factory fire where the sprinklers operated prematurely, the damage was on a scale equivalent to the original cost of equipment. The structure of the building survived. It happened over night so no staff were involved. The best solution would be to have all the escape routes sprinklered. To do this it would be necessary to take special measures to ensure water could not enter the flats, after a false operation of the sprinklers. I have some doubt, if occupants would willingly walk down 28 floors of a building soaking wet. The real solution is to make the shell fire proof, as is mandated in Germany and have two separate escape routes. Most commercial buildings I have been involved with of this vintage certainly do have or have them added at some later date and these are only 3/4 stories.
I believe the central failure in the building regulations is the same as in other UK engineering professions, is the lack of mandatory certification for all detail sign off of drawings and designs. A system to The Canadian model or that used in Germany would be a good start.
Totally agree with your comment about the superiority of the German / Canadian models.
Am not a fan of water-sprinklers per se. As your experience has found, they provide the equivalent of a deluge, and with very expensive consequences – especially when they are activated accidentally.
Far superior to water-sprnklers, are water-MIST systems, which are both more effective AND less-damaging to furnishings and even sensitive electronic equipment. They have PROVEN capability (from transformer fires to marine-engine rooms to everything in between), and are being used to protect sensitive computer installations. These systems can – and have – been activated while this equipment is running WITHOUT subsequent deleterious effect! Try that that with sprinklers – NEVER!
As to fitting sprinklers into the stairwells, this doesn’t solve the problem at all. The primary problem in a fire is that the stairwells become flooded with toxic smoke. First, escapees cannot see where they are escaping to (is it down through the smoke INTO the flames below?? Once this thought crosses your mind, you become paralyzed with indecision).
Secondly, opaque toxic smoke in a stairwell is THE prime killer. The solution is not sprinklers at all, but the ACTIVE introduction of an over-pressure of CLEAN air into the ENTIRETY of the stairwell. This MUST be the focus of fire-evacuation certification in any and every building – new or existing. All an escapee on ANY floor needs to know, is that they if they can make it to the stairwell, they will have IMMEDIATELY found assured safety, and a viable escape.
Right now, most stairwells in far too many EXISTING buildings, have the potential to become nothing less than smoke-filled DEATH-TRAPS for both escaping residents, and incoming fire-fighting teams.
This single aspect – of itself – needs serious, urgent attention.
Prof Hansford. “Inevitably the Judicial Inquiry and any criminal investigation may take time to complete. It is important however that the profession moves quickly to capture and implement lessons as quickly as possible.” :: lessons weren’t learned for Cullen compliance post-Piper Alpha as noted in my prior pontifications re OTO98162 & Macondo so why would they be this time?
I recfall a safety manager at ICI all those years ago suggesting that all expenditure in these areas should be prefaced by consideration of a simple question. ” How much would you spend to ensure my safety as opposed to how much would I spend to ensure yours?” Always do the most expensive! It was a similar consideration to that I recall from boarding school, when a cake was to be divided into two. “One cuts, the other chooses!”
IF, I repeat IF, the start of the fire was the fridge, a small cylinder of HALON on all plastic backed fridges would have stopped the fire at source. That quantity of halon would have done less damage to the atmosphere than the building fire that resulted.
Report in the Daily Mail on 17th June stated “Documents show Proteus panels, sold by KME Architectural Solutions, were initially specified for the Grenfell project by architects Studio E. Proteus panels are made with a non-flammable metallic honeycomb core.” Although these panels are completely fire resistant I am assuming the build would be the same, with the small “air gap” between the panel and wall insulation, creating a wind tunnel effect.
I regard this disaster as a “house of cards” in that the fire should not have started in the first place, it should have been contained in the one flat, it wasn’t, and once it escaped up the outside it took out the windows. (Were they mechanically fixed in place or just “foamed” in position?? )
Then there were the exposed gas pipes in the stairwells. What were they doing there? They should have been boxed in, but hadn’t. In the TV footage I saw, sudden bursts of blue flame came out of the side of the building, which I assume was a gas pipe failing.
The loss of life is a tragedy and I hope that those who are directly involved obtain some closure in this disaster
Thin sheets of honeycomb aluminium are NOT non-flammable.
Put thin aluminium into a good fire, and you are positively ASKING for trouble!
This is the reason why there is so much valid concern about using aluminium superstructures in warships. As evidenced by the recent attack off Yemen of a Saudi vessel (an ex USN contracted vessel basically similar to the popular Australian-made Seacats), this became a firebomb disaster. And this in a vessel where there was the FULL prior design anticipation of dealing with
incendiary fires of serious magnitude! Makes one think twice about the inherent risks of specifying aluminium in ANY situation where a fire (of sufficient magnitude) can arise.